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COMMENTS
JURISDICTION TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR TO
SUE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
A recent case decided by the Appellate Court of Indiana
raises the question of jurisdiction to appoint a personal repre-
sentative for the purpose of bringing an action for wrongful
death of decedent.' In this case a petition was filed for the
removal of the administrator and the cancellation of letters of
administration. Decedent had been a resident of Illinois. While
traveling in Indiana he was killed by alleged negligence of peti-
tioner. The decedent had property in his possession in Indiana
at his death consisting of twenty-five dollars in cash and a leather
grip containing various articles of clothing, etc. It was held (1)
that the claim for damages for the death of a non-resident by
wrongful act of a person in Indiana will not support the appoint-
ment of a local ancillary administrator; (2) but that the exist-
ence of the personal property of the decedent in Indiana at the
time of his death will support local ancillary administration. It
may be added that when decedent died the personal property in
his possession in Indiana was sent to the widow in Illinois. After
the appoint of the local administrator the property was returned
to him.
The two propositions decided in this case demand rather close
scrutiny and require some expL-nation. Two problems are al-
ways present where it is sought to appoint a local ancillary ad-
ministrator for any purpose. In the first place there is the
Conflict of Laws problem, that is to determine whether or not
the local state has jurisdiction, as a state, in the common law
sense of the word jurisdiction, to appoint an administrator. In
other words, this means in the instant case, did Indiana have
jurisdiction to 'appoint an ancillary administrator which would
be recognized by courts in other states? In the second place
there is the problem of whether or not the law of the ancillary
state authorizes its probate court to appoint a local administrator
under the circumstances of the case. This means in the instant
case, did the local statute law of Indiana authorize the probate
1 Mercer v. Dobbyn, 173 N. E. 338 (Ind. App. 1930).
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court to appoint a local administrator under the circumstances
of the case, that will be recognized by other courts as valid? So
far as the Conflict of Laws aspect of the case is concerned, the
authority is somewhat indirect. Conclusions must, for the most
part, be formulated from cases in which power has actually been
exercised. When a practice in the states is carried on without
challenge by other states, it is some substantial authority that
there is common law jurisdiction. When other states do not chal-
lenge the exercise of power, they thereby recognize such power.
At the same time such cases illustrate the local municipal law in
the various states concerned. Thus the cases that will be sub-
sequently cited constitute direct authority as to the local law
and indirect authority as to the Conflict of Law aspect of the
point.
The statute of Indiana, like the statute of nearly every other
state in the Union, authorizes the appointment of ancillary ad-
ministrator in the county in which the intestate has left assets.2
The recent case has decided that personal property of slight value
which decedent had with him at the time will satisfy the statute.
There is ample authority to sustain this point. Thus a non-
resident who has items of the value of four or five dollars has
been held to leave an estate which will authorize administration. 3
One case even held that an estate of $1.50 was sufficient.4 The
fact that this property was only temporarily in the state is im-
material. Although the state may not have jurisdiction in the
common law sense to tax such property,:, it may nevertheless
administer it,6 although in many cases it will not do so but will
recognize the power of the domicile of the decedent to administer
such property.7 The fact that the property is removed from the
state immediately after decedent's death will not deprive the
state of power to appoint an administrator either as a matter of
Conflict of Laws or as a matter of local law., Thus the fact that
2 Burns' Ind. Stat. 1926, Sec. 3066.
3 Aiisouri Pacific R. R. v. Bradley, 51 Nebr. 596, 71 N. W. 283 (1897).
4 Cox v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 86 Kans. 298, 120 Pac. 553 (1912). See
also Turner v. Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 133, 101 S. W. 119 (1907); Barlass
v. Barlass, 143 Wis. 497, 128 N. W. 58 (1910).
1 Estate of McCahill, 171 Cal. 482, 153 Pac. 930 (inheritance tax).
6 Turner v. Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 133, 101 S. W. 119 (1907); Wells v.
Miller, 45 I1. 382 (1867).
7 See Story, Conflict of Laws (8th Ed.), pp. 737-738.
8 Anderson v. Louisville & N. R. R., 128 Tenn. 244, 159 S. W. 1086
(1913); Embry v. Miller, 1 A. K. Marsh (Ky.) 300 (1818).
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the personal property in the Mercer case was returned to the
administrator is entirely immaterial.
If the personal property had not been in Indiana at the time
of decedent's death here but had subsequently been sent into the
state there could be local ancillary administration. A large number
of cases are authority for the fact that a state may and will ap-
point an administrator for chattels which come into the-state
after the death of decedent. 9 If, however, they are brought or
sent into the state by a foreign administrator a local representa-
tive will not be appointed or if he is already appointed he will
have no authority to interfere with the property.1° It has even
been held that if a debtor of the decedent comes into the state
after the decedent's death a local administrator may be appoint-
ed to collect the claim.1
Thus the court seems on perfectly safe grounds in refusing
to revoke the letters in the case in question. However, the de-
cision does not seem so sound in so far as it denies jurisdiction to
appoint an administrator solely for the purpose of suing for the
wrongful death of the decedent. It seems perfectly obvious that
there was no necessity whatever for local administration upon
the tangible personal property which the decedent left in In-
diana. Apparently there were no debts owed by decedent to
Indiana creditors. The chattels and money had been returned
to his domicile. The only reason for a local representative was
to facilitate the prosecution of the wrongful death claim. Where
appointment is necessary or convenient for such purposes it
ought not to depend upon the existence of a small amount of
practically worthless property. To permit local administration
when a few dollars are found on decedent at his death and to
deny it if he is out of the state when he dies and thus leaves no
property whatever in the state, is unnecessarily technical, high-
ly inconvenient and extremely unsound. Furthermore, it is un-
called for. While there are a couple of Indiana cases upon which
the court in the present case relies, the rule has been repudiated
by a large number of more modern decisions in courts of many
states. In fact a number of these cases have gone much farther
9 Matter of Hughes, 95 N. Y. 55; Miller v. Jones, 26 Ala. 247 (1855);
Collins v. Bankhead, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 25; Neal v. Boylin, 137 Ga. 400, 64
S. E. 480. Contra, Meyers v. Ferris, 109 So. 209 (Fla.).
10 Hill v. Barton, 194 Mo. App. 325, 188 S. W. 1105; Crescent City Iea
Co. v. Stafford, Fed. Cas. No. 3387.
"1 Stearns v. Wright, 51 N. H. 600; Saunders v. Weston, 74 Me. 85.
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than it were necessary for the Indiana court to go in the Mercer
case.
The difficulty which the court experienced was in regarding
the claim for wrongful death as "assets" of decedent in Indiana.
In so far as the claim for wrongful death is a chose in action,
there would seem to be no objection to regarding it as an asset
in Indiana inasmuch as the debtor is domiciled in Indiana.
Courts have uniformly regarded debts as assets at the domicile
of the debtor for purposes of administration.12 Logically, no
doubt, the claim for wrongful death does not represent a chose
in action which decedent owned before his death. The wrongful
death statute creates a new cause of action and, under the ordi-
nary Lord Campbell's Act, is not a mere survival of a right which
the decedent owned. However, such a claim inures to the benefit
of the widow or widower and children or next of kin and is "to
be distributed in the same manner as personal property of the
deceased."' 13 Thus for practical purposes the right is valuable
property of the estate and there is no reason in law or in com-
mon sense why it should not be so regarded. The action under
most statutes must be brought by the personal representative.
No one else except the person designated in the statute may en-
force the claim.14 Thus if the widow is designated to sue, an
administrator cannot sue;15 conversely if the administrator is
designated, the widow cannot sue. 16 Since at common law a per-
sonal representative in one state cannot sue outside the state of
his appointment,17 a foreign administrator must procure ancil-
lary letters before suit can be brought, unless he be regarded as
a trustee of a special fund who does not sue as administrator at
all,' 8 as to which there is some modern authority of great weight.
Accordingly, the modern tendency is clearly to permit the
appointment of and suit by a local ancillary administrator at the
place where the injury was inflicted, even though there are no
12 Emery v. Hildreth, 2 Gray, (Mass.) 228 (1854) ; Miller v. Hoover, 121
Mo. App. 568, 97 S. W. 210 (1906); Murphy v. Creighton, 45 Iowa (1876).
13 Burns, 4426, Sec. 292.
14 American Law Institute Restatement of Conflict of Laws, sec. 431.
15 Brown v. Sunby Creek Co., 165 Fed. 504 (1908).
16 Usher v. West Jersey R. R., 126 Pa. 206, 17 At!. 597 (1889).
17 Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wins. 369; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156,
35 L. Ed. 112.
18 Conner v. N. Y., N. H., etc. R. R., 28 R. I. 560, 28 AtI. 560. See
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 210.
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other assets in the state. This is the weight of authority. 9
Such jurisdiction will be recognized as valid in other states. 20
Likewise an administrator has been appointed at the domi-
cile of decedent where there are no other assets in the state.2 '
But there are a number of recent cases which have gone still far-
ther and have permitted the appointment of a local ancillary ad-
ministrator when the injury occurred in another state. Thus, a
state may appoint an administrator solely for the purpose of
bringing suit for wrongful death when decedent was domiciled
outside the state and when the injury occurred outside the state,
the only condition being that the defendant is subject to suit in
the state where administration is spught.22
It would seem perfectly clear that from the Conflict of Laws
point of view, Indiana has jurisdiction to appoint a local ancil-
lary administrator solely for the purpose of bringing an action
against an Indiana defendant. From the point of view of the
local statutory law it would appear that the Indiana statute is
identical with statutes in many other states that permit local
administration under such circumstances. In fact a local statute
which was not mentioned in the Mercer case would seem to sug-
gest this result. Sec. 3240 Burns' 1926 provides for the filing of
an administrator's report "whenever an administrator is ap-
pointed for the sole purpose of collecting damages for personal
injury res'ilting in the death of any decedent and the only assets
coming into the possession of said administrator is money so
collected." This statute does not indicate in any way that an
administrator may be appointed "for the sole purpose of collect-
ing damages, etc.," only when decedent was domiciled within the
state. The statute recognizes the validity of administration
when there is no estate except the claim for wrongful death. It
seems an unnecessary implication to limit such administration to
19 Sharp v Cinn., etc., R. R., 133 Tenn. 1, 179 S. W. 375 (1915) ; Hutch-
ins v. St. Paul, etc., R. R., 44 Minn. 5, 46 N. W 79 (1890); Re Mayo's Es-
tate, 60 S C. 401, 38 S. E. 634 (1901). See Am. Cas. 1917 C, 1217, collect-
ing many cases.
20 McCarron v. New York Cent. R. R., 239 Mass. 64, 131 N. E. 478
(1921).
21 Mo. Pac. v. Lewis, 24 Nebr. 848, 40 N. W. 401 (1888).
22 1n Re Lowhans's Estate, 30 Utah 436, 85 Pac. 445; State v. Probate
Court, 149 Minn. 464, 184 N. W. 43; Howard v. Nashville, etc., R. R., 133
Tenn. 19, 179 S. W. 380.
23 Re Stone's Estate, 145 N. W. 903 (Iowa). Contra, Illinois Cent. R. R.
v. Cragin, 71 Ill. 177.
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local residents in view of the obvious trend of modern decisionl
and the important considerations of convenience and expediency.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision in the Mercer case
is not to be commended in so far as it denies to local probate
courts authority to appoint a representative solely to bring an
action for the wrongful death of a non-resident against a defend-
ant who is subject to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts.
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER.
